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Myopic loss aversion 
Narrow bracketing 
a b s t r a c t 
We measure the marginal effects of two crucial dimensions of the Investment Game design 
of Gneezy and Potters (1997, GP97) and its replications: time frequency and time horizon . To 
this aim, we randomize between subjects five different time frequencies: 1 round (“High 
Frequency” in GP97), 3 rounds (“Low Frequency”), but also 6, 9 and 12 rounds. As for time 
horizon, we compare the baseline GP97 horizon (9 rounds) with smaller (3 and 6 rounds), 
but also higher (12 rounds) alternatives. We find that, holding the time horizon constant, 
subjects invest more when they evaluate their investments less frequently, but this result 
is significant only when time horizon is sufficiently long. We also find that lower frequen- 
cies increase the marginal investment at a decreasing rate . As for time horizon, we find 
that, holding time frequency constant, the higher the horizon, the lower the investment 
(although, as in the previous case, investment lowers at a decreasing rate). Our reduced 
form results also show that subjects’ behavior is sensitive to the endowment stock pro- 
vided along the experiment, independently of time frequency. 
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 






Myopic Loss Aversion (MLA hereafter, Benartzi and Thaler, 1995 ) is one of the prominent theoretical conjectures arising 
from Behavioral Economics. It nicely combines two fundamentals of the behavioral approach to individual decision making: 
loss aversion ( Kahneman and Tversky, 1979 ) and mental accounting ( Kahneman and Tversky, 1984 ; Thaler 1985 ). According
to MLA, investors take more risk when they evaluate their portfolios less frequently. 
Without any doubt, the popularity of MLA within and beyond the boundaries of Behavioral Economics also comes from 
the convincing evidence provided by Gneezy and Potters’ (1997 , GP97) experiment, a classic in the field. GP97 presents a
simple investment game in which subjects face a sequence of 9 iid lotteries. Each one of these lotteries gives a probability
of p = 1/3 of winning α = 2.5 times the amount invested, and a probability of 2/3 of losing it. Two alternative treatments
are distributed between subjects: in the High Frequency (HF) treatment, subjects make their investment decision at each 
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(LF) treatment subjects make their decision every 3 rounds, after receiving feed-back on the last sequence of 3 investment 
rounds. As it turns out, this design feature has an important impact on risk-taking behavior: consistently with MLA, subjects 
invest some 17% more in the LF treatment (67.6% of the total endowment) rather than in the HF treatment (50.6%). 
Along the years, GP97 experimental design has become a classic and has been replicated by various authors who have 
consistently confirmed the MLA conjecture (see, among others, Haigh and List 2005 , Bellemare et al. 2005 , Sutter 2007 ,
Fellner and Sutter 2009 , Eriksen and Kvaloy 2010 , Iturbe-Ormaetxe et al. 2016 , 2019 ). All these experiments replicate GP97
parametrization exactly , namely, ( i) a time horizon of 9 rounds, ( ii) two time frequencies of 1 (“High”, HF) and 3 (“Low”,
LF) and the basic parameters of the one-round lottery (investment return and winning probability). 1 In this respect, the 
experimental evidence so far lacks of “stress tests” of the GP97 design, exploring the behavioral properties of investment 
game experiments outside GP97 parametrization, with specific reference to time frequencies and time horizon. 2 
Designing one of such stress tests is the main purpose of this paper. More specifically, our objective is twofold. First,
we aim at providing a robustness check by randomizing between subjects 5 different time frequencies: 1 round (“F1”), 3 
rounds (“F3”) but also 6, 9 and 12 rounds (“F6”, “F9” and “F12”, respectively). To implement this, we also need to randomize
across different time horizons of the investment game. Specifically, we contrast the baseline GP97 horizon (9 rounds, “H9”) 
with smaller (3 and 6 rounds: “H3” and “H6”, respectively) and higher (12 rounds, “H12”) alternatives. These extensions 
also provide valuable information on both frequency and horizon effects. To the best of our knowledge, randomizing time 
horizons in a GP97 experimental environment is a novel contribution of this paper. This allows us to test a key component
of MLA, namely, myopia. In fact, since myopia assumes that each investment decision is taken independently (i.e., with no 
links with past and/or future decisions), the number of investment rounds (which also affects the cumulative endowment 
at subjects’ disposal within the experiment) should not matter. 
We shall summarize here our main findings. As for the frequency dimension, we find that when the time horizon is
“short” (H3 or H6), frequency effects are relatively small. By contrast, when time horizon is “long” (H9 or H12) subjects 
invest more in the F3 treatments with respect to the F1 treatments (this is the result GP97 and its replications are best
known for). However, this frequency effect is reduced when we move from F3 to even higher frequencies. Here we see that
investment increases at a slower pace, if it does not increase at all. As for the horizon dimension, we find the general result
that, holding frequency constant, the longer is the horizon, the lower the investment. This -novel, to our knowledge- stylized 
fact is at odd not only with MLA (as we noticed earlier) but also with standard models of Expected Utility (take, e.g. the
CRRA version of Mossin, 1968 ), by which a longer horizon would call for higher investment due to higher asset integration.
Time horizon effects have been studied -using binary lotteries similar to those proposed by Samuelson (1963) , Benartzi and
Thaler (1999) and Klos et al. (2005) . In both studies one of the results related to ours is that, when subjects have to esti-
mate the probability of a loss for a lottery with multiple repetitions, they overestimate it by a wide margin. Although they
understand that such loss probability is decreasing in the experimental horizon (see Fig. 4 below), this measurement error 
gets bigger as the horizon gets larger. This, translated in our decision frame, may lower average investment, compared to a
situation in which such loss probabilities would have been identified correctly. 3 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the design of our experiment, in which we ran-
domize between subjects various time frequency and time horizon conditions, besides GP97 original parametrization (still 
maintaining GP97 original lottery parameters, both in terms of winning probabilities and investment returns). Section 3 re- 
ports some descriptive statistics of our experimental evidence. Specifically, we confirm, once again, the main findings of 
GP97 and their replications: subjects’ willingness to invest is increased when frequency of decision is reduced. However, our 
evidence also highlights the fact that time horizon needs to be sufficiently long for this effect to be noticeable and that, for
even longer horizons, this frequency effect gets weaker. As for the time horizon ( Section 3.2 ), we find that, holding time fre-
quency constant, the higher the horizon, the lower is the investment (although, as in the previous case, investment lowers 
at a decreasing rate). Section 4 complements our descriptive analysis with some reduced form tobit regressions in which we 
look for (and find) nonlinearities in the relations between investment and frequency/horizon effects. In Section 5 we discuss 
about the relation between our stylized facts and the underlying design of GP97 investment game experiments, with spe- 
cific reference to the current accumulated stock of experimental capital and expectations of future returns (proxied by the 
endowment flow available in future investment rounds). As Table 3 clearly shows, dependence of investment on time hori- 
zon hides a stronger dependence of investment on both accumulated and perspective capital, suggesting that investors’ loss 
aversion may lower their risk taking behavior as they accumulate (or expect to accumulate) enough experimental capital 
compared to some latent subjective referent upon which they condition their investment decisions. Finally, Section 6 con- 1 As for the time horizon, the only exceptions are Hopfensitz and Wranik (2008) and Fellner and Sutter (2009) who implement a 15 and 18 period 
horizon, respectively. Consistently with the evidence reported here (see Table A.1 in Appendix A), they find that the average investment decreases in both 
treatments (33.3 in HF and 56.6 in LF compared with 50.6 and 67.6 in GP97). 
2 Other design features of GP97 have been the object of interest in the context of replication. For example, Bellemare et al (2005) and Fellner and 
Sutter (2009) test whether higher investment in the LF treatment is due to lower investment flexibility and/or information feedback. Their findings are not 
conclusive: while Bellemare et al (2005) find that is feedback rather than flexibility what matters most to yield higher investment in the LF treatment, 
Fellner and Sutter (2009) find that both design features seem to influence higher investment in the LF frame in the same direction. 
3 With an investment decision frame similar to GP97, Klos (2004) compares two time horizons, H1 and H2, when subjects have the chance to revise 
their investment decision after each period (i.e., under F1). He finds no significant difference in average investment across horizons in this case. 
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Table 1 
Treatment random assignment (number of subjects for each treatment between brackets). Cells highlighted in light gray 
(H9-F1 and H9-F3) correspond to the parametrization of GP97 and its replications. Cells highlighted in dark gray corre- 
spond to treatments that are unfeasible by design (either because F (frequency) is higher than H (horizon), or because H 















cludes, followed by two appendices containing additional statistical evidence, proofs (Appendix A) and the experimental 
instructions (Appendix B). 
2. Methods and procedures 
Fourteen experimental sessions were conducted at the Laboratory of Theoretical and Experimental Economics (LaTEx) 
at the Universidad de Alicante, involving a total of 306 participants, 154 males and 152 females. Our experimental design 
includes 12 between-subject treatments, as sketched in Table 1 . All treatments follow closely some of the features of GP97
original design. For each investment round, subjects are given an endowment of 100 eurocents. They have to decide the 
amount, x ∈ [ 0 , 100 ] , they wish to invest in a lottery, L (x ) , whose payoffs are 100 + αx or 100 − x, with probability p or 1- p ,
respectively. In GP97 (and most of its replications) α and p are set equal to 5/2 and 1/3 as to make the expected return of the
investment, r( x ) = x (( 1 + α) p − 1 ) = x 6 , which is strictly increasing in the quantity invested, x . Financial rewards correspond 
to the cumulative monetary payoffs in the experiment. 
Our experimental treatments randomize -between subjects- the basic GP97 layout across the time frequency and time 
horizon dimensions. As for time frequency, in all F1 treatments (frequency = 1), subjects play rounds one by one. They invest
in each round, then the lottery is carried out and they know the outcome and invest for the next round. In F3 treatments
subjects invest for three consecutive plays of the same lottery. Then, after the 3 iid lotteries are carried out and subjects
know the outcomes, they have to decide the investment for the following three rounds. In F6 treatments subjects take one
decision for every 6 successive rounds, in F9 one decision for the 9 rounds and in F12 one decision for the 12 rounds. As for
time horizon, we complement the standard GP97 layout (9 periods) with shorter (3 and 6 periods, H3 and H6, respectively)
and longer (12 periods, H12) alternative. 4 
As for time frequency, in all F1 treatments (frequency = 1), subjects play rounds one by one. They invest in each round,
then the lottery is carried out and they know the outcome and invest for the next round. In F3 treatments subjects invest for
three consecutive plays of the same lottery. Then, after the 3 iid lotteries are carried out and subjects know the outcomes,
they have to decide the investment for the following three rounds. In F6 treatments subjects take one decision for every 6
successive rounds, in F9 one decision for the 9 rounds and in F12 one decision for the 12 rounds. 
The two highlighted cells of Table 1 correspond to GP97 original treatments (“HF” vs “LF”, in GP97 terminology). In 
addition, we also explore 10 additional treatment configurations in which time horizon (time frequency) varies from 3 to 12 
(1 to 12), respectively. 
3. Descriptive statistics 
3.1. Frequency effects 
In our descriptive analysis, we shall look at the frequency dimension first. Fig. 1 tracks average investment across treat- 
ments by time horizon. In the treatments with a time horizon of 3 or 6 rounds (H3 or H6, respectively), we find no sig-4 Clearly, randomization across time frequencies and horizons cannot be independent across dimensions, but it is constrained by the fact that, for some 
( F,H ) pair, either F may be higher than H , or because H may not a multiple of F (these situations correspond to the dark grey cells of Table 1 ). In this 
respect, the term “randomization” has to be interpreted with respect to the fact that, within the set of feasible ( F,H ) pairs, the assignment of a subject to 
a specific treatment is completely random. 
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nificant differences in average investment between frequencies F1 and F3. Mann-Whitney (MW) non-parametric statistics 
cannot reject the nulls H 0 : H3-F1 = H3-F3 ( p = 0.13) and H 0 : H6-F1 = H6-F3 ( p = 0.32). 
In contrast, we do find differences between F1 and F3 in treatments with horizons of with 9 and 12 rounds (H9 and
H12). 5 Both MW tests, in this case, reject the null at 5% confidence. However, when we compare F1 with F6, F9 or F12 in
treatments with horizons H9 and H12, we can only reject at 1% the null for treatments H12-F1 and H12-F6. In all other
cases, we can only reject the null at 10% confidence for treatments H9-F1 and H9-F9 ( p = 0.0560) and for H12-F1 and H12-
F12 ( p = 0.0728). That is, in the extreme cases when subjects evaluate their investments only once average investments
increase but the difference is only weakly significant. 
To summarize, subjects invest more when they take fewer decisions, but this is not true for the extreme situations 
when they take only one decision for the total investment. In addition, keeping time horizon constant, marginal investment 
increases with our frequency variable (i.e., when the frequency of decisions decreases) at a decreasing rate, to become 
negative when time horizon is long enough. 
3.2. Horizon effects 
Fig. 2 recompiles the same information as in Fig. 1 by reporting mean investments per treatment keeping frequency 
constant and varying time horizon. As Fig. 2 shows, holding time frequency constant, aggregate investments decrease with 
time horizon at a decreasing rate: being the strongest when horizon moves from 3 to 6 rounds. 
4. Reduced form regressions 
Our descriptive analysis offers two clear testable conjectures that we now look in more detail. The first one relates to
frequency effects. This is the core of the MLA hypothesis: once we reduce the number of decisions (i.e., our frequency
variable increases) we should expect investment to grow. In this respect, the descriptive analysis of Section 3.1 confirms this
conjecture but, at the same time, also highlights that marginal investment grows at a decreasing rate (to become negative 
at times). In other words, descriptive data seem to show a non-linear relationship between frequency of decisions and 
investment behavior. The second conjecture is -to the best of our knowledge- novel and relates to the existence of a horizon5 Treatments H9-F1 and H9-F3 replicates the GP97’s experiment with the same number of periods. GP97 obtain an average investment of 50.5% in HF 
and 67.4% in LF treatments. This is much in line with our results since we find 44.67% in HF and 62.14 % in LF for the same time horizon (see Table A.1 in 
the Appendix). 
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effect. What the evidence of Fig. 2 seems to suggest is that when we increase the time horizon of the investment game,
average investment decreases. Again, Fig. 2 seems also to suggest that investment decreases at a decreasing rate. 
In Table 2 we test our preliminary conjectures by running some Tobit regressions in which individual investment deci- 
sions are regressed against our treatment variables (F and H) together with their corresponding variables squared (F 2 and H 2 ,
respectively). In regression (1) we use a cross-section of our dataset averaging investment for each individual participant; in 
regression (2) we use a cross-section of subjects’ first investment decision; in regressions (3–6) we run random-effect tobit 
regressions of the individual investment decisions. Regression (3) has the same structure as (1); regression (4) also include 
period dummies in the set of covariates. Finally, in regression 5 (6), we control for possible dynamic trends in the data,
including in the set of the covariates the investment period (squared), respectively. 
As Table 2 shows, our descriptive analysis finds empirical validation in that the coefficients of F and H 2 (H and F 2 ) are
always positive (negative), respectively, while first (second) order effects are always significant at 5% (10%) confidence, re- 
spectively. Comparing regressions (1) and (2), we see that first and second order effect are even stronger when we look only
at subjects’ first decisions, which cannot be affected by any prior risk realization. Finally, we also notice from regressions 
(5) and (6) that dynamic effects are weak, if not insignificant (see also Fig. 5 below). 
Another possible way to deal with non-linearities is to consider the interactions between time frequency and time hori- 
zon treatment variables. Fig. 3 plots the average marginal effects of a random-effect Tobit regression in which individual 
investment is regressed against the corresponding time frequency, time horizon, and the interaction between the two co- 
variates. 6 As Fig. 3 shows, the only significant movement of both marginal effects is for the first two values of F and H ,
respectively. Subsequently, no other significant change is detected. 
5. Discussion 
This section conjectures on some possible explanations for our “diminishing sensitivity” results, together with auxiliary 
interesting stylized facts uncovered by our augmented experimental design. 6 Table A.2 in Appendix A reports the full estimated coefficients. 
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Table 2 
Tobit regressions (I). 
VARS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
F 5.003 ∗∗ 6.117 ∗∗∗ 5.662 ∗∗ 6.940 ∗∗∗ 5.936 ∗∗ 6.188 ∗∗∗
(1.956) (2.223) (2.362) (2.464) (2.368) (2.375) 
F 2 −0.324 ∗∗ −0.368 ∗∗ −0.374 ∗ −0.437 ∗∗ −0.374 ∗ −0.382 ∗
(0.161) (0.183) (0.201) (0.206) (0.201) (0.201) 
H −8.566 ∗∗∗ −11.02 ∗∗∗ −8.331 ∗∗ −8.775 ∗∗ −8.609 ∗∗ −9.106 ∗∗∗
(2.952) (3.355) (3.492) (3.535) (3.496) (3.514) 
H 2 0.436 ∗∗ 0.565 ∗∗ 0.405 ∗ 0.418 ∗ 0.405 ∗ 0.433 ∗
(0.193) (0.2189) (0.226) (0.228) (0.226) (0.227) 
per 0.562 2.058 ∗
(0.356) (1.191) 
per 2 −0.137 
(0.104) 
const. 79.72 ∗∗∗ 84.50 ∗∗∗ 80.38 ∗∗∗ 76.99 ∗∗∗ 79.82 ∗∗∗ 78.66 ∗∗∗
(9.436) (10.73) (11.50) (11.73) (11.50) (11.53) 
sigma_u 28.19 ∗∗∗ 28.32 ∗∗∗ 28.21 ∗∗∗ 28.19 ∗∗∗
(1.817) (1.812) (1.816) (1.815) 
sigma_e 833.9 ∗∗∗ 1066 ∗∗∗ 28.70 ∗∗∗ 28.18 ∗∗∗ 28.63 ∗∗∗ 28.61 ∗∗∗
(75.94) (102.6) (0.856) (0.842) (0.855) (0.854) 
Random effects NO NO YES YES YES YES 
Period dummies NO NO NO YES NO NO 
Obs. 306 306 1100 1100 1100 1100 
# of subjects 306 306 306 306 306 306 
Robust st. err. (clustered within subjects in regr. 3–6) within parentheses. 
∗ p < 0.1. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
∗∗∗ p < 0.01. 





5.1. Frequency effects 
As for the frequency marginal effects, we first notice that the impact of the frequency of decisions on the proba-
bility of a negative (cumulative) payoff is, on average, diminishing -not monotonically, though- as the interval between 
decisions increases. Remember that the classic storytelling behind the MLA rational for the GP97 results works as fol- 
lows: if losses weigh more than gains, the probability of a negative (cumulative) payoff is higher in the HF treat- 
ment ( 2 3 = 1 − p > ( 1 − p ) 
3 = 8 27 ) . In the GP97 case calculations are relatively simple because, in the LF treatment, a negative 
cumulative payoff can only be associated with three negative outcomes in a row. Under the same parameter setting (i.e., 
( α= 5/2 and p = 1/3) Fig. 4 tracks the probability of a negative cumulative payoff as a function of the number of rounds
where the same decision is kept constant, that is, the probability with which a binomial distribution of n iid lotteries with
payoffs of α ( −1) with probability of p (1- p), respectively, yields a negative cumulative outcome. 
As Fig. 4 shows, this probability goes to 0 as n goes to infinity. This is a straightforward implication of the central limit
theorem. However, this probability does not reach its limit monotonically since -at varying intervals that ultimately depend 130 
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Fig. 4. Probability of a cumulative loss after n iid draws of a GP97 lottery ( α= 5/2 and p = 1/3). 




on α and p - the number of instances by which the cumulative payoff is negative ( n losses, n -1 losses and 1 gain, n -2 losses
and 2 gains, etc.…) increases with n. This consideration notwithstanding, as Fig. 4 clearly shows, the impact of these “peaks”
on the overall dynamics vanishes as n increases. This may suggest that MLA subjects may become less sensitive to the
probability of a loss as the frequency of decisions decreases, which is exactly what happens in our augmented experimental 
design. 131 
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Table 3 
Tobit regressions (II). 
VARS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
F 5.587 ∗∗ 12.47 ∗∗ 5.908 ∗∗ 12.79 ∗∗ 5.143 ∗∗ 11.14 ∗ 5.164 ∗∗ 11.27 ∗
(2.348) (6.154) (2.353) (6.154) (2.317) (5.855) (2.317) (5.830) 
F 2 −0.371 ∗ −1.314 −0.370 ∗ −1.313 −0.305 −1.037 −0.304 −1.040 
(0.200) (0.959) (0.199) (0.959) (0.196) (0.905) (0.196) (0.905) 
H −6.186 ∗ −3.887 −5.676 −3.373 0.373 0.251 
(3.567) (4.335) (3.575) (4.343) (1.033) (1.123) 
H 2 0.398 ∗ 0.237 0.397 ∗ 0.236 
(0.225) (0.273) (0.225) (0.273) 
K t −0.0201 ∗∗∗ −0.0201 ∗∗∗
(0.00778) (0.00781) 
k t −0.0217 ∗∗∗ −0.0218 ∗∗∗ −0.0218 ∗∗∗ −0.0218 ∗∗∗ −0.0196 ∗∗∗ −0.0205 ∗∗∗
(0.00781) (0.00784) (0.00782) (0.00785) (0.00483) (0.00541) 
w t −0.0284 ∗∗∗ −0.0285 ∗∗∗ −0.0286 ∗∗∗ −0.0286 ∗∗∗ −0.0260 ∗∗∗ −0.0271 ∗∗∗
(0.00895) (0.00898) (0.00896) (0.00899) (0.00549) (0.00616) 
cons. 80.18 ∗∗∗ 66.21 ∗∗∗ 79.50 ∗∗∗ 65.51 ∗∗∗ 62.48 ∗∗∗ 56.00 ∗∗∗ 63.40 ∗∗∗ 56.68 ∗∗∗
(11.43) (13.73) (11.43) (13.73) (6.127) (8.195) (5.580) (7.612) 
1-timers YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO 
Obs. 1100 993 1100 993 1100 993 1100 993 
# id 306 199 306 199 306 199 306 199 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
∗ p < 0.1. 
∗∗ p < 0.05. 
























5.2. Horizon effects 
The simple idea of a “horizon effect” goes at odds with that of “myopia”: “In general, narrow framing of decisions and
narrow framing of outcomes tend to go together, and the combination of both tendencies defines a myopic investor …” ( Thaler
et al., 1997 , p. 648). In this respect, our rich randomization over frequencies and horizons seems ideal to investigate over
the time-framing of our subjects’ investment decisions. 
Fig. 5 tracks the evolution of investment behavior across treatments and rounds. As Fig. 5 clearly shows, we cannot
identify a clear dynamic trend in our data (with the exception of the LF treatment as in GP97, where average investment
clearly grows over time). While investment does not seem to have a distinct dynamic pattern, we look for alternative vari-
ables that may explain our (marginally decreasing) negative horizon effect. A natural candidate to look at is the value of
the portfolio, either in terms of its evolution as a function of investment decisions and lottery outcomes, but also in term
of the anticipation of future endowments. This is relevant in our analysis for, at least, two reasons. First, because it directly
affects the interpretation of the same concept of “myopia”, and not only in the context of MLA. In fact, as we know from
Mossin (1968) , also for a wide class of utility functions (including, among others, CRRA) an expected utility maximizer finds
optimal to treat each single-round decision myopically, that is, as if it were the last one. Individuals base each round’s deci-
sion ‘‘ on that period’s initial wealth and probability distribution of yields only, with the objective of maximizing expected utility of
final wealth in that period while disregarding the future completely ’’ ( Mossin, 1968 , p. 223). In this sense, for standard portfolio
theory investors are also myopic, in that they maximize utility over the action of the current round only. By contrast, they
are not myopic in that they perform full asset integration: what they condition their current investment decision upon is 
the present value of their accumulated experimental income plus that of all future endowments. 
In this sense, standard optimal portfolio behavior also involves conditioning, that is, adapting risk-taking behavior to the 
evolution of the present value of final portfolio (which clearly depends on the horizon of the experiment, rather than the
frequency of decisions). On the other hand, dependency of investment on the portfolio value is somewhat neglected by the 
standard MLA rationale (see Appendix A for details). 
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients of some random-effect tobit models in which individual investment is regressed 
against frequency and horizon variables (as in Table 2 ) but also against three different proxies of the evolution of the port-
folio over the experimental horizon: k t = 100 t + 
∑ 
τ<t 
z t ; w t = 100( H − t ) and K t = k t + w t . In words, k t is the current value of
the portfolio (excluding future endowments), where z t = αx t ( z t = −x t ) if the investment is (un)successful, respectively; w t 
is the value of future endowments, and K t is the present value of the final portfolio including future endowments not yet
disposable at round t . While K t corresponds to the expected value of “final wealth” upon which standard portfolio decisions 
are conditioned, our variables k t and w t split this value in its past (future) components, respectively. 
To the extent to which K t is highly correlated with H, models (1) to (8) exclude gradually H in the set of regressors. In
addition, we also estimate our model both including all subjects (1-timers = “YES”), but also excluding those who take only
one decision throughout the experiment (treatments H3-F3, H6-F6, H9-F9 and H12-F12 see Table 1 ). As Table 3 shows, our
results -significant negative effects of both accumulated and perspective capital on investment- are robust across all model 
specifications. The coefficients of k t and w t are similar in magnitude, although the effect of w t is always higher (in absolute132 







value, with the difference being significant at 10% confidence in all regressions, this indicating a marginally higher impact 
of accumulated experimental capital on current investment. 
6. Conclusions 
Diminishing marginal sensitivity is often invoked as a realistic auxiliary assumption in many behavioral domains, both 
within and outside standard economic theory (take, for example, the assumption of “gain and loss satiation”, one of the 
building blocks of Prospect Theory). Our main contribution is to highlight another domain that exhibits diminishing marginal 
phenomena: MLA. Both with respect to frequency and horizon effects. As for the former, we confirm GP97 main evidence 
with the caveat that marginal effects are diminishing when we further decrease the frequency of decisions. By randomizing 
choice frequencies, we also need to manipulate time horizons, which allows us to study the dynamics of investment game 
experiments along a complementary dimension. Our novel evidence highlights an intriguing stylized fact: average invest- 
ment is decreasing in the time horizon dimension (again, with diminishing sensitivity). 
Our “diminishing sensitivity” results may suggest that, when frequency/horizon are longer, subjects could be overestimat- 
ing the probability of a loss (and, in consequence of that, lower their investment) as it has been observed by Benartzi and
Thaler (1999) and Klos et al. (2005) in games with repetitions. Moreover, the estimates of Table 3 show a stronger depen-
dence of investment on both accumulated and perspective capital. In a similar way the NY taxi drivers in Crawford and
Meng (2011) , investors’ loss aversion lowers their risk taking behavior as they accumulate (or expect to accumulate) enough 
capital compared to some latent referent that depends negatively (i.e., it is a substitute in the investment’s strategy) on 
both variables. This intriguing dependency of (both, accumulated and perspective) experimental capital and investment may 
prompt further “robustness checks” of the GP97 protocol beyond the scopes of this paper (for example, by manipulating 
subjects’ endowment in each round, keeping fixed horizon and frequency, or distributing the same aggregate endowment 
across different horizon/frequency pairs). 
Supplementary materials 
Supplementary material associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.07.031 . 
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